Abstract: In *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics* Catherine Lu argues that structural reconciliation, rather than interactional reconciliation, ought to be the primary normative goal for political reconciliation efforts. I suggest that we might have good reason to want to retain relational approaches – such as that of Linda Radzik – as the primary focus of reconciliatory efforts, but that Lu’s approach is invaluable for identifying the parties who ought to bear responsibility for those efforts in cases of structural injustice. First, I outline Lu’s analysis of reconciliation, where she argues for the normative priority of structural approaches within the global political sphere, and propose that it will be useful to identify whether or not a relational account could instead identify underlying structural injustices. Second, I examine one particular relational account of reconciliation (based on Radzik’s account of atonement) and argue that this type of account brings to light underlying structural injustices of the kind Lu is concerned with. Finally, I identify an issue for relational accounts in identifying relevant responsible parties for reconciliation before returning to Lu’s structural account to address this gap.

Keywords: reconciliation; structural alienation; relational alienation; atonement; Catherine Lu; Linda Radzik.

Introduction

In *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics* Catherine Lu argues that structural reconciliation, rather than interactional reconciliation, ought to be the primary normative goal for political reconciliation efforts. I suggest that we might have good reason to want to retain relational approaches as the primary focus of reconciliatory efforts, but that Lu’s approach is invaluable for identifying the parties who ought to bear responsibility for those efforts in cases of structural injustice. I proceed as follows: First, I outline Lu’s analysis of reconciliation, where she argues for the normative priority of structural approaches within the global political sphere. I propose that, given other good reasons to find relational accounts valuable, it will be useful to identify whether or not a relational account could instead identify underlying structural injustices. Second, I examine one particular relational account of reconciliation (based on Radzik’s account of atonement) and argue that this type of account brings to light underlying structural injustices of the kind Lu is concerned with. Third, I argue that despite its merits Radzik’s relational account nevertheless faces a significant challenge in identifying relevant responsible parties for reconciliation. I propose that
Lu’s structural account provides the tools to address this gap. The final section concludes.

**Forms of Reconciliation in Global Politics**

**Lu: the Normative Primacy of Structural Reconciliation**

There are, Lu suggests, three forms of reconciliation: (i) interactional; (ii) existential; and (iii) structural. Their primary goal is the redress of alienation either: (i) between agents whether ‘individually, collectively, or corporately conceived’ (Lu, 2017: 183); (ii) from one’s own authentic agency (Lu, 2017: 184); or (iii) from social and political institutions, norms and practices (Lu, 2017: 190), respectively. Lu argues that reconciliation requires political action because it is ‘a response to the alienation revealed or produced by political catastrophes’ (Lu, 2017: 183). As such, whilst reconciliatory projects may seek to redress all forms of alienation, their primary focus is not existential reconciliation, but interactional and/or structural. Of the latter two approaches Lu eschews what she takes to be the contemporary focus on interactional (or relational) reconciliation. She convincingly argues that, in practice, giving primacy to interactional accounts may:

‘(1) [...] [focus] on a medicalized notion of individual psychological healing from traumatic experiences; (2) [...] appeal to an unrealistic and undesirable form of conflict-denying social unity that, in reality, serves to pressure the politically weak to accommodate evil and injustice; and (3) [...] foreclos[e] progressive political struggle to redress deeper structural sources of alienation’ (Lu, 2017: 183).

Lu illustrates her concerns with an account of the atrocities suffered by the Herero and Nama tribes of South West Africa (now Namibia) in the early 20th century at the hands of German colonisers, and of the subsequent failures to adequately achieve reconciliation for tribal members in post-colonial Namibia. Both tribes suffered the destruction of their livelihoods, the erasure of their rights, and the loss of their freedom through mass incarceration (Lu, 2017: 1), with accompanying existential harms. Interactional political reconciliation efforts have since focused primarily on reconciliation between the Namibian State and the German government, and only more recently on the potential for obtaining reparations for the tribal populations (Lu, 2017: 198-9; 122). The lack of inclusion of Herero and Nama voices and concerns within latter-day Namibian state negotiations with post-colonial Germany is, Lu offers, an

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1 The descendants of the paramount chief of the Herero, Samuel Maherero, for example, are prevented from having their remains buried in the same site as their ancestor (Lu, 2017: 3), creating individual existential alienation from the tribe’s own traditions and history and preventing the colonised subjects from being able to lead authentic lives as members of that tribe.
example of *structural* alienation from the international world order: an order in which ‘indigenous and other precolonial peoples’ are ‘forced into sovereign state and interstate systems that do not recognize their status as peoples or groups who could have suffered distinct historical wrongs’ (Lu, 2017: 199). Additionally, the tribal populations affected by colonisation remain structurally subjugated *within* the Namibian state, with the latter’s concerns for preserving positive relations with other members of the international community taking precedence. Lu argues that when social and political institutions and ‘practices allow some agents to treat others as if they were nothing, then they constitute an objective source of alienation for the victims, independently of the specific harms that they suffer at the perpetrators’ hands’ (Lu, 2017: 189). The tribal members whose voices and needs are subjugated in reconciliation efforts therefore experience a deeper structural alienation which prevents effective existential or interactional reconciliation.

Lu’s concern then, is that a focus on interactional reconciliation at the expense of examining structural alienation restricts the possibility for actual resolution of existential and interactional alienation, narrowing both our understanding of what reconciliation ought to aim at and what it might require (Lu, 2017: 189-90). Lu posits that, instead, a project of *structural* reconciliation is necessary to create the ‘background conditions’ of respect required for also redressing the interactional and existential alienation which has accompanied colonialisation and which persists in the decolonised state (Lu, 2017: 192).

*Relational Accounts and Structural Alienation*

Lu has provided us with an exceptionally helpful way of understanding the limitations of traditional interactional approaches to reconciliation. When structurally unjust background conditions exist, the potential for reconciliation may be limited and may not even be desirable: reconciliation with an unjust world order is, as Lu notes, a questionable target.

However, whilst structural considerations matter, so do relational ones. As Stilz argues, ‘One strength of the interactional approach is that it provides a firm foundation for special reparative obligations on specific participants in relationships’ (2019: 392). I will not defend this claim here, but it is plausible that there may be demands of justice which fail to be met when we consider reparation as *a primarily* structural project rather than as a broad relational one which might simply *include* consideration of structural injustices. If this might be the case, then it is worth considering whether or not an understanding of reconciliatory projects in relational terms *necessarily* fails to address structural injustices as Lu believes that it does, rather than simply having failed to do so in the past or to date.
But even if this is not the case, there are at least two other reasons to examine whether or not we can reconcile relational accounts with the adequate consideration of underlying structural issues that Lu advocates. First, we will still have undertaken an important conceptual understanding of what the scope of reconciliation attempts for interactional / relational accounts might be, as opposed to what contemporary reconciliatory projects have assumed them to be, thus challenging existing frameworks. And second, there may be something to be said for a single account of how we ought to approach reconciliation across both the personal and political sphere, given that these harms often intersect. Whilst Lu’s project examines reconciliation at the political level for injustices committed against the inhabitants of formerly colonised states, where structural features are critical, reconciliation in the personal sphere is far less likely to be concerned with these features. A relational account which can accommodate structural concerns where necessary, but which does not depend on them to ground its approach, may therefore be the more likely candidate for a unified theory across the personal and political spheres. So, for these reasons, we should consider whether any form of relational account can accommodate identification of structural issues.

A Relational Account of Reconciliation

Wrongdoing and Relationships

The most plausible candidate for a relational account which has the potential to address structural injustices within reconciliatory projects is, perhaps, that provided by Linda Radzik in her work on atonement. In *Making Amends: Atonement in Morality* (2009), Radzik argues for a relational understanding of what is wrong with wrongdoing in general:

‘Wrongdoing sends an insulting and threatening message about the victim that has the potential to influence negatively the victim’s view of herself, the community’s view of both the victim and the wrongdoer, and the wrongdoer’s view of himself in relation to others’  
(Radzik, 2009: 85).

Because wrongdoing involves damage to relationships – between the wrongdoer and the victim, between the victim and a wider community of

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2 This approach is contrasted by Radzik with two alternative approaches. The first sees atonement as the repayment of a moral debt, whether taken as retribution against the wrongdoer or provided as restitutive compensation for the victim (Radzik, 2009: ch2). Moral debt accounts, Radzik argues, fail to appreciate either the moral significance of the victims of wrongdoing (retributive accounts) or the relevant role of the wrongdoer herself in providing penance (restitutive accounts). They are also likely to lead to the types of concern highlighted by Lu in section II. The second approach understands the act of atonement as something which requires a form of transformation ‘of either the wrongdoer or the wrongful action’ (Radzik, 2009: 22). These accounts focus on the repentance of the wrongdoer and her steps to undergo change. In doing so they miss what Radzik considers to be the crucial social aspect of both wrongdoing and atonement: the need for penance to incorporate some form of communication or repair with the victims of wrongdoing (Radzik, 2009: ch3). They will also fail to consider underlying structural issues.
people, between the victim and herself, and between the wrongdoer and herself – reconciliation will similarly require the repair, or steps towards the repair, of each of these relationships. Radzik’s relational account, therefore, sees the primary duty-bearers for atonement as being those who have participated in, or committed, acts of wrongdoing. We can expect from this that reconciliation is a process which takes place between wrongdoers and their victims, with their respective duties to contribute determined by their relative hierarchical positions as victim / wrongdoer. The agents involved might be individual or collective, and the relationship which has been damaged may even, or only, be between a given agent and herself.

This nuanced relational account will therefore, most obviously, be able to assist with the first of Lu’s forms of reconciliatory targets – interactional reconciliation – given the approach’s focus on the restoration of relationships. It will also assist with the second form of reconciliation – existential – given that at least one relationship which has been damaged might be that with oneself. But can this relational account offer appropriate coverage of underlying structural injustices where these exist?

Relational Reconciliation and Moral Status Injuries

One of the goals of reconciliation within Radzik’s framework is to restore the (perceived) moral status of victims.3 ‘In wronging others, the offenders treat those whom they harm as having lower value than they’ (Radzik, 2009: 76). Those responsible for wrongdoing are therefore required to work towards the restoration of ‘a paradigmatically moral relationship […] wherein the parties regard one another and themselves as equally valuable moral persons’ (Radzik, 2009: 81). We see echoes of this concern with moral status in Lu’s structural account of alienation. Lu argues that it is precisely when certain persons are not treated as having equal moral status by the social norms and practices of a given society, state or international world order, that structural alienation occurs. The agent is alienated from the very norms and practices of her society as a result of structures which ‘allow some agents to treat others as if they were nothing’ (Lu, 2017: 189). Structural solutions are, Lu argues, required to address this alienation.

One distinction between the relational and structural accounts is that the

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3 Specifically, this is listed as a goal for atonement, but atonement requires the working towards reconciliation. The other goal of atonement in many cases is to restore the perceived moral standing of wrongdoers and their victims (whether this is perceived by the victims, wrongdoer, or other parties in the community. This section on moral status and moral standing is a little obscure in Radzik. Moral status is taken to be the intrinsic moral worth of an individual; moral standing appears to include both the perceived capability of an individual to act morally, and the extent to which an individual is perceived as having that equal moral status. Wrongdoing appears to harm the victim in terms of her perceived moral status (by herself, others, or by the wrongdoer), whilst it harms the wrongdoer in terms of their perceived capability to act as a reliable moral agent.
relational account does not pre-assume that the victim’s impaired moral status comes about through being alienated from society or the social order. Rather, it comes about through her being treated as having less moral worth than those whom she is in relevant relationships with. This moral status can be restored with appropriate atonement on the part of the wrongdoer and restoration of the damaged relationship(s). This has led to worries regarding the tenuousness of the claim to significantly impaired moral status through relational harms in cases of harms experienced at the hands of random strangers. When one chooses to forgive a random stranger for a minor incident Richards suggests that it seems implausible to suggest that a process of re-establishment of an existing relationship between moral equals has taken place:

‘Consider the stranger whose car drenches you with mud. Having seen this in her mirror, she stops to apologize, insists on paying your cleaning bill, and so on. Surely it is possible to forgive this woman, just as it would be if she were an equally repentant friend. But to call this “reaccepting” her or “reestablishing our relationship” is rather strained: there was no relationship, and there is none after she drives away’ (Richards, 1988: 79).

Relationships with the Wider Community: Uncovering Structural Injustices

However, the relationships damaged by acts of wrongdoing may be further-reaching than between those of the immediate interacting parties. Radzik argues that Richards’ critique takes a primitive understanding of ‘relationship’ which misses the relationship between an individual and her wider society. When a random driver splashes a pedestrian and does not stop to apologise for the damage caused it is not, as Richards argues, only the (minor) relationship between an individual driver and pedestrian which is harmed. Rather, our resentment ‘spills over to others’ (Radzik, 2009: 79). As the pedestrian we determine that ‘Drivers today are careless and rude’ (Radzik, 2009: 79). Thus, our relationship with the entire community of drivers, who we now treat with suspicion and pre-prepared resentment, has been damaged (we are interactionally alienated from this community, understood in Lu’s terms). Radzik’s account requires that, ‘the relationships that must be repaired in the aftermath of wrongdoing are [all] those that have been wrongfully damaged’ (Radzik, 2009: 81). In the splashed pedestrian case the harmed relationship is that between the pedestrian and the community of drivers. As such, this is the primary relationship which Radzik takes as needing to be repaired as a result of the original act of splashing.

Our search for reconciliation might then require us to consider far more than
the original act between an individual and her most immediate or obvious source of injury. Clearly, we can take this analysis beyond the case of the individual pedestrian and her relationship with the community of drivers. On the global scale, when one party is harmed by another a sophisticated relational account of reconciliation – in which our goal is to search for all impacted relationships – will require us to look beyond the parties who are most directly involved in the harm. It is entirely plausible that this analysis would lead us to relationships with various structures and communities where these relationships exist. And the moral status which needs to be restored through repair of those relationships might therefore be at the level of the structural alienation which Lu identifies, depending on the actions taken by members of those wider communities.

By way of example, we can consider two cases. First, Lu’s case of the Syrian refugees in Canada. Here, a group of refugees were pepper-sprayed by an individual on a bike. ‘The attack was widely condemned by civic officials and the police treated it as a hate crime’ (Lu, 2017: 189) and the Canadian Prime Minister apologised to the victims ‘on behalf of himself and the Canadian people’ (Lu, 2017: 189). Lu argues that ‘In this case, the alienating interaction between the victims and the perpetrator did not translate into an experience of structural alienation’ (Lu, 2017: 189), due to the actions and words of the Canadian state and its representatives. Following the actions of various state parties, Radzik’s relational account would examine the relationships between the refugees, the lone pepper-sprayer, and the community of ‘the Canadian people’ and identify that only the (minor) relationship between the refugees and pepper-sprayer remained un-restored, leaving only the minimal moral status injury caused by the pepper-sprayer.

But we might well imagine a different case, in a neighbouring country, in which a similar initial harm was perpetrated against a group of refugees but in which no speech was forthcoming by the President. And in this neighbouring country, rather than there being police willing and able to enact legislation against hate speech, there might be legislation designed to protect free (hate) speech and to restrict immigration into the country. And this may all be taking place within a society in which the government and President have repeatedly verbally criticised the immigrant population and others who share the refugees’ religious beliefs.⁴ Given these background conditions, a relational account would identify that the relationship between the victims and ‘the community of people in the country,’ in addition to their relationship with the national government and the police force had been harmed with no atonement or reconciliation activity. As such, structural alienation, in Lu’s terms, would be likely.

⁴ E.g. as arguably has been the case in the United States in recent years (Buncombe, 2017; Zurher, 2017).
Radzik’s response to Richards then indicates that the relational account may be able to identify the deeper harm to moral status caused by structural injustice through considering the full range of relationships which might be harmed in any given instance of wrongdoing. As such, given that the relational account can identify both structurally and non-structurally caused moral status harms there may be greater flexibility over Lu’s structural account to apply the relational approach to reconciliation across both political and personal cases of wrongdoing. The nature and scope of the moral status injury and who or what the reduced status is in relation to will depend on the specific relationships impacted by a given wrong. And the requirements for addressing any given relational harm may include structural solutions. As such, the relational account appears to offer coverage of concerns relating to structural injustice.

Why the Relational Account Also Needs Lu’s Structural Analysis

It appears then that a fully nuanced and wide-ranging relational account of reconciliation might have the potential to bring structural injustice to light indirectly through recognising the full range of relationships involved. If so then, contra Lu, we may not need to take structural analysis as the primary goal of reconciliation projects in order to actually identify and deal with structural alienation.

But whilst we may not need to take structural reconciliation as normatively primitive in order to identify underlying structural issues as targets for reconciliation acts, instead allowing it to be recommended by the relational approach as and when it is appropriate, I will nonetheless argue that we may still need to undertake distinct structural analysis of the kind Lu advocates for when considering which parties are responsible for undertaking reconciliatory acts.

Relational Accounts: Possible Responsibility Gaps

We have seen in the previous section how simple interactional acts of wrongdoing may have implications for a victim’s relationships with others who share salient features of the wrongdoer’s identity, and that a full consideration of all affected relationships, and the actions taken to attempt reconciliation, may highlight structural injustices where these exist. But this analysis leaves a question unanswered. When wider relationships are damaged as a result of an initial interactional harm, who, under the relational account, is responsible for working towards the reconciliation needed to repair those wider relationships?

One response would be to target the original wrongdoer. However, this response is insufficient. First, in many cases, the original party responsible for the initial harm may be unavailable to perform this act. The random driver who splashes the pedestrian and drives off, harming the pedestrian’s relationship
with the community of drivers is unlikely to be encountered again and so will be unable to engage in any reconciliatory efforts. And second, it’s not always clear how the initial wrongdoer might be capable of restoring these wider relationships to ones of equal moral status.

This might then suggest that it is members of the broader community who bear responsibilities for restoring this damaged relationship with the victim. When we consider Lu’s Canadian example, or the modified example of the neighbouring country, we certainly appear to be looking to others to bear the duty.

**Problems with Holding the Wider Community Responsible**

But this approach – that members of the wider community with whom the victim now has a damaged relationship bear the responsibility for restoring that relationship – is hugely problematic in many cases. The mere sharing of an identity feature with the original wrongdoer is insufficient to ground such a responsibility. In what sense does the fact that I happen to share an identity feature with some other person who committed a wrongdoing, imply that I have a duty to atone for the wrongdoings of others, or to work towards reconciliation?

We can see the problem when we examine alternatives to the Canadian case.

Consider the claim, for example, that a terrorist act perpetuated in the United States by a lone individual, who happens to be Muslim and a refugee, has damaged the relationship between ‘the Muslim community’ and all non-Muslim citizens in the state. Newspapers and others call for ‘the Muslim community’ to offer reconciliatory actions, such as condemning the act, disassociating themselves from the motives of the individual terrorist, and defending their Islamic faith in the media against accusations of innate violent tendencies etc.. Here, those calling for such acts are demanding a performative act of reconciliation of (i) demonstrating trustworthiness; (ii) communicating sorrow for the harms caused such that the threat any individual now feels from ‘the Muslim community’ is withdrawn; and (iii) offering reparation for the harms caused. But there appears to be something very wrong with placing the same kinds of expectations on ‘the Muslim community’ in this case as we placed on the Canadian population after the pepper spray incident.

More generally: the claim that members who share salient identity features to the original wrongdoer are generally responsible for reconciliation efforts

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5 When considering acts of wrongdoing committed by members of institutions and / or authorised in some way by the state, Radzik advocates that part of the duty for atonement may rest on those individuals associated with the community of those who are implicated, but who have not themselves harmed. In certain cases, at least one reason why individuals who were not involved in the original act of wrongdoing ought to atone and work to repair the relationship between the harmee and the community involved, is simply that they are the only ones who can do this work: ‘A third reason for requiring current group members to repair historical injustices is that they are the only ones who can do so’ (Radzik, 2009: 196). But even if I might have some kind of duty of rescue of this kind, this does not appear to be obviously derived from assessing the relational harms incurred.
is, at best, unsatisfactory when considering shared identity of which one has no particular voluntary control (if there is one bad driver is it actually my responsibility as an unrelated driver to restore the splashed pedestrian’s faith in all other drivers?). However, it becomes deeply problematic when considering shared identity in which the identity is one which has itself experienced systematic oppression and structural alienation. In the case of the Muslim community and the lone terrorist the claim might be that the relationship between all Muslim and all non-Muslim citizens within the society has been damaged. But under structural conditions in which Muslims are regularly discriminated against – such as those arguably existing within the United States right now – those who are experiencing damaged relationships with ‘the Muslim community’ as a whole may, in fact, be committing an injustice of their own against that wider community of structurally alienated agents by choosing to allow that relationship to be damaged.

**What We Need: a Structural Understanding of Context**

What the relational account cannot do, without additional scaffolding, is identify who ought to be responsible for reconciliation efforts and under what circumstances they are responsible for those efforts. This is where Lu’s structural account becomes invaluable.

Note that in the Canadian example earlier the individual refugees may have briefly felt structurally alienated: ‘another refugee, Hazaa Sahal, explained that although immediately after the attack, some refugees regretted relocating to Canada, the ‘feeling quickly evaporated’ (cited in Lu, 2017: 189). However, the acts of the police and government leaders post-incident demonstrated that refugees were not structurally alienated within Canada in practice. Any lingering feelings of structural alienation on the part of the refugees would therefore, I suggest, have been misplaced.

Thinking in these structural terms helps us with understanding the incomplete analysis in Radzik’s account. In the Muslim terrorist case, the victims of an individual attack may well feel structurally alienated, for example (interpreting the attack as evidence that Islamic culture has somehow taken over), causing them to demand reconciliation efforts from unrelated Muslim citizens in the wider community, but this would be misplaced. Social and political institutions and practices in the United States do not treat white non-Muslim citizens as inferior. In fact, the opposite is arguably true.

Lu’s structural account of when members of wider communities might bear responsibility for the harms perpetuated by colonial and post-colonial states and therefore for reconciliation activities can help us understand where
reconciliation efforts ought to fall more generally when wider relationships are harmed. To identify the responsible parties for reconciliation efforts we must make a distinction between feeling structurally alienated and actually being structurally alienated. Identifying the underlying conditions under which some parties are treated with lower moral status than others (experiencing structural alienation) allows us to identify targets for the responsibility of engaging in reconciliatory efforts aimed at repairing wider structural relationships. In the case of the injustices faced by the Herero and Nama tribes (as an example of the colonial cases Lu is concerned with):

‘[…] moral responsibility for wrongful acts can certainly be attributed to the colonizing state and culpable individuals, but some share of historical responsibility should also be attributed to all states, especially the dominant ones, that contributed to perpetuating the unjust social structures of a colonial international system […] Acknowledging colonialism as structural injustice does not displace assessments of agents’ liability for wrongful actions but identifies other agents that contribute to the production of colonial injustices and raises the question of their remedial responsibilities’ (Lu, 2017: 127).

In discussing structural reconciliation Lu argues that reconciliation has both objective – robust rights and agential protections (Lu, 2017: 190) – and subjective – ‘agents’ nonalienated affirmation […] of the rules, relations, and conditions of the domestic and/or international social/political order’ (Lu, 2017: 190-1) – components. But when, objectively, the conditions which would have necessitated structural reconciliation (i.e., those causing structural alienation) are not actually present, any harms to wider community relationships may not be the fault of either the initial wrongdoer, those sharing an identity with the wrongdoer, or the wider community. As such, they ought not to bear the primary responsibility for attempting reconciliation.

In the case of the pedestrian and the community of drivers, are there any plausible candidates for significant responsibility for reconciliation activity? This will be contextually variable depending on the presence of structural injustices. If the pedestrian lives within a state in which laws exist which encourage drivers not to stop when they splash pedestrians, then the state might be responsible for damage to the pedestrian’s relationship with the community of drivers. Or, if the individual lives in a society in which social norms are such that drivers are incentivised to behave without care towards pedestrians (perhaps as part of a wider set of norms in which respect towards pedestrians is mocked, for
example), then society as a collection of non-agentially connected individuals may be responsible for reconciliatory acts.\textsuperscript{6,7}

However, it may be that there are no such conditions in place in the driving example. Assume instead that the pedestrian lives in a society in which there are no particular legal or social expectations which encourage or promote poor driver behaviour. In this instance the only remaining candidates for responsibility for the damage to her relationship with the community of drivers appear to be the original driver who caused the harm (and who cannot be found) and the pedestrian herself for unreasonably projecting negative ascriptions onto an unrelated population based on the actions of one individual. It is therefore, I suggest, the pedestrian who must work to reconcile the structural alienation she feels in the relationship between herself and the community of drivers.

Lu’s structural account of reconciliation then offers a plausible way of distinguishing between cases in which the relationship between an individual and a given society / state / structure / community has been damaged and reconciliation falls on individuals within that wider community, and cases in which a relationship has been damaged but this duty to reconcile does not fall on those individuals but rather on the initial victim and / or wrongdoer. Without a structural analysis, the relational account fails to provide an adequate account of these responsibilities.

**Conclusion**

Lu’s structural account of reconciliatory activity draws important and necessary attention to the need to address underlying structural injustices within the international world order. This does not, however, necessarily entail that we must give structural accounts normative priority in considering political approaches towards reconciliation. I have argued that a unified approach to reconciliation across the political and personal spheres would recommend working from a sufficiently rich relational approach instead and that such an approach can address Lu’s primary concern with regard to structural injustices and alienation. A deep understanding of all of the ways in which wider relationships are damaged by acts of wrongdoing, as in Radzik’s account, has the potential to identify the structural injustices from which alienation and relational damage may flow, whilst also being of a form that can be used for non-political analyses of wrongdoing.

\textsuperscript{6} Individual responsibility may flow towards each member of society depending on one’s preferred best account of the relationship between collectives and their individual members.

\textsuperscript{7} Note that it is each individual member of society not each member of the driving community that bears the duty here. Social norms are the responsibility of all who participate within them (perhaps to varying degrees depending on the extent to which an individual is herself oppressed or harmed by those norms, but the principle remains). They are not only the responsibility of those who happen to be members of the particular group whose relationship with S has been damaged.
Nevertheless, I have also argued that relational accounts need structural analysis of the kind Lu advocates once all relevant impacted relationships have been identified. With such an analysis, these accounts can move beyond merely recognising that there is some form of harm, and towards an understanding of what reconciliation requires and which parties ought to actually be responsible for pursuing it.

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