This special issue on global justice and non-domination constitutes the second step in the relaunch campaign that Global Justice: Theory, Practice, Rhetoric started with the previous issue. For a brief account of the journal’s history and of the aims of the relaunch campaign, please see the editorial introduction of Issue 8/2.

Power is a key concern of international politics, one that the discipline of International Relations has been carefully examining for decades. Political theorists, by contrast – or at least those working within the analytical tradition – have devoted comparatively little attention to the question of which exercises of power beyond borders are problematic. Instead, they have focused on global material deprivation and have elaborated increasingly sophisticated accounts of which principles should govern the distribution of natural and socio-economic resources across borders. But why should we care so much about the distribution of material resources per se, when news that makes the headlines is all about power? We switch on our TV sets, and are told that: Russia invades Ukraine, the European Union struggles to solve its sovereign-debt-crisis (for example, German banks put pressure on the German state, who then puts pressure on the Greek state), ISIS conquers territories across several weak or almost collapsed states, the international community fails to legislate against the interests of powerful global actors, such as banks, and so forth. A narrow focus on the distribution of material resources appears out of touch with the most pressing political problems characterizing the international realm. And while global poverty is undoubtedly a problem, some of the inequalities condemned by theorists of global distributive justice seem particularly worrisome precisely in virtue of the power asymmetries that stem from them.

In response to this, analytic political theorists have finally started to engage with the issue of power across borders. Theorists from the ‘republican’ tradition have been at the forefront of this engagement, and this special issue is devoted to an exploration of their contribution to international political morality. Taken together, the articles contained in this issue reveal that the
republican contribution is fourfold. Republicanism offers (i) a moral language for evaluating international power, (ii) a new perspective on the role of the state in international political morality, and (iii) distinctive insights on the question of which normative concerns should hold domestically and which should extend globally. Finally, (iv) republicanism has contributed to and arguably reinvigorated the debate on problematic forms of power – and on the concept of domination in particular – thus enriching the array of views on what counts as domination beyond borders. In this brief introduction, we touch on all four aspects in turn, and conclude with short summaries of the original articles contained in this issue.

The core republican concept of freedom as non-domination – understood as the absence of the power to interfere arbitrarily with agents’ choices – addresses the very question of the conditions under which the power agents hold over each other may be morally acceptable. The republican notion of freedom as non-domination provides a normative language flexible enough to evaluate and challenge not only the use of power between individual and/or corporate agents – e.g., between states and their citizens or between different states – but also the complex underlying structures that distribute power across different agents. This renders republican thinking particularly apt to engage with those normative deficiencies created by the ‘new circumstances’ of today’s neo-liberal, globalised political order, in which states’ sovereignty is eroded by the pressures exerted by economic actors such as banks and powerful transnational corporations.

On top of providing an arguably superior normative language to describe and assess international politics, republican approaches to global justice also give us a fresh perspective on some long-standing questions within the theoretical debate on global justice, such as the role of the state. According to many republican accounts, the state is a necessary locus of non-domination, and hence not as easy to discard at the level of fundamental principle as those who see the state as a malfunctioning mechanism for duty-distribution suggest. Furthermore, to the extent that states are indispensable vehicles to counter domination at home, it seems important that they not be dominated ‘from the outside.’ But why, exactly, do states need to be free in the sense of not being dominated by other states or powerful private actors? How does this matter to their citizenry? Is it at all possible for citizens to be free even if their state is dominated? These are questions the debate on republicanism and global justice has only just started to explore, and which are systematically taken up by the contributions to this special issue.
Thirdly, theories of non-domination must grapple with the question of whether non-domination is a value that should primarily be fostered within states, between states or within the global order writ large. The contributors to our special issue disagree widely on this. However, this debate – in this issue as well as in most other republican contributions to the global justice literature – differs from the liberal-egalitarian debate on the scope of justice. The latter is a debate about who does and who does not have certain justice-based claims – most notably, whether distributive equality is a demand of global justice or only holds within domestic borders. The former, instead, is not a debate on who has a claim to non-domination, but on how best to protect it. As we have noted above, the state is often seen as valuable by republicans because of its unique instrumental role in guaranteeing non-domination, rather than as a source of otherwise non-existing claims of justice. In other words, even for republican statists, the point is not that outsiders have no claim not to be dominated by us, but that a world organized in states is the best way of protecting the non-domination of all. Whether such claims are coherent, tenable, and how exactly they play out practically is a topic which our contributors grapple with in a range of different ways. While some hold on to the traditional republican idea that the state is the privileged place to institutionalize non-domination, others embrace more explicitly cosmopolitan perspectives.

Finally, the republican tradition has encountered many criticisms with regard to its underlying conceptions of freedom and non-domination, and this remains true when it tries to address questions of global justice. Whereas some theorists have contended that the very concept of domination is problematic, incoherent, or redundant, others have tried to rescue it from a specifically republican interpretation – questioning, in particular, whether Pettit’s original definition of capacity for arbitrary interference and his understanding of arbitrariness really capture the distinctive evil of non-domination.

This special issue consists of four original articles. Philip Pettit’s piece extends the principle of freedom as non-domination to the international realm, defending a moderately statist picture of international political morality. On Pettit’s view, a just international order, from a republican perspective, must be one where (i) all human beings belong to ‘a free people,’ namely a people that does not dominate its members, and (ii) free peoples do not dominate one another. The realization of the second aspect of this ideal, Pettit says, requires states to intensely cooperate, forming effective international institutions and organizations.
Dorothea Gädeke’s contribution may be seen as a direct response to the picture of a just republican order painted in Pettit’s. Gädeke argues that, from a republican perspective, all collective political agents – not merely non-dominating states – have a claim to non-domination. Her view is based on the observation that dominating a state, even one that dominates its members, necessarily implies dominating its people. In particular, state domination interferes with the people’s ability to (re-)constitute itself as a free political agent. This argument results in a broadly statist picture of global justice, but one more inclusive than Pettit’s or indeed Rawls’s *Law of Peoples*. For Gädeke, all states should be members in good standing of the international order, and have a claim to non-domination.

Frank Lovett’s piece argues that republicans should adopt a decidedly cosmopolitan position regarding global economic justice. According to this view, economic justice obligations vis-à-vis non-compatriots are as strong as economic justice obligations amongst compatriots. The reason for this, for Lovett, is that economic inequality leads individuals to pursue the improvement of their economic position in ways that make them the victims of domination. Thus, for example, the poor often decide seeking employment in sweatshops or as undocumented workers in wealthy countries, although they thereby subject themselves to domination. Hence republicans should be concerned about economic justice in other countries just as much as they are concerned about economic justice in their own countries. They must not restrict this kind moral concern to their compatriots only. This is why Lovett concludes that ‘republicans should be cosmopolitans.’

Nicolas Vrousalis, finally, argues that the republican understanding of non-domination cannot account for the way in which capitalist domination is exercised in the current global market and hence cannot account for the evils of global capitalism. He then puts forward a theory of imperialism, understood as domination of a state by another state, which does not rely on a republican understanding. Vrousalis argues, in particular, 1) that there is a useful and defensible distinction between colonial and liberal imperialism, which maps on to a distinction between coercive and liberal domination; 2) that the main institutions of contemporary globalization are largely the instruments of liberal imperialism; and 3) that resistance to imperialism cannot be founded on a right to national self-determination, but should be grounded instead in a right to resist domination.
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