Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric <p><em><img class="shadow" src="/public/site/images/adminglobal/Cover-GJ-20192.png" alt="" align="left">Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric</em> (TPR) is a peer-reviewed, open-access e-journal which publishes original research in international political theory, with special emphasis on global justice. We are particularly interested in bridging the gap between political theory, empirical research, and the study of political practices and communication. <a title="About the Journal" href="/global/index.php/gjn/pages/view/about-the-journal">Read more...</a></p> en-US Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric 1835-6842 Introduction <p>N/A</p> Christine Straehle Copyright (c) 2019-11-25 2019-11-25 11 2 i i 10.21248/gjn.11.02.201 Structural Alienation: Lu’s Structural Approach to Reconciliation from within a Relational Framework <p>In Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics Catherine Lu argues that structural reconciliation, rather than interactional reconciliation, ought to be the primary normative goal for political reconciliation efforts. I suggest that we might have good reason to want to retain relational approaches – such as that of Linda Radzik – as the primary focus of reconciliatory efforts, but that Lu’s approach is invaluable for identifying the parties who ought to bear responsibility for those efforts in cases of structural injustice. First, I outline Lu’s analysis of reconciliation, where she argues for the normative priority of structural approaches within the global political sphere, and propose that it will be useful to identify whether or not a relational account could instead identify underlying structural injustices. Second, I examine one particular relational account of reconciliation (based on Radzik’s account of atonement) and argue that this type of account brings to light underlying structural injustices of the kind Lu is concerned with. Finally, I identify an issue for relational accounts in identifying relevant responsible parties for reconciliation before returning to Lu’s structural account to address this gap.</p> Leonie Smith Copyright (c) 2019-11-25 2019-11-25 11 2 1 14 10.21248/gjn.11.02.211 Redress for Colonial Injustice: Structural Injustice and the Relevance of History <p>This article analyzes and criticizes the temporal orientation of Catherine Lu’s theory of colonial redress in Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics. Lu argues that colonial historic injustice can, with few exceptions, justify special reparative measures only if these past injustices still contribute to structural injustice in contemporary social relations. Focusing on Indigenous peoples, I argue that the structural injustice approach can and should incorporate further backward looking elements. First, I examine how Lu’s account has backward-looking elements not present in other structural injustice accounts. Second, I suggest how the structural injustice approach could include additional backward-looking features. I presuppose here, with Lu, that all agents connected to an unjust social structure have a forwardlooking political responsibility to reform this structure, regardless of their relation (or lack thereof) to victims or perpetrators of historic injustice. However, I suggest that agents with connections to historic injustice can occupy a social position that makes them differently situated than other agents within that same structure, leading to differences in how these agents should discharge their forward-looking responsibility and differentiated liability for failure to do so. Third, I argue that Lu obscures the importance of rectifying material dispossession. Reparations, pace Lu, can be justified beyond a minimum threshold of disadvantage. Theorists of settler colonialism and Indigenous scholars show how the dispossession of Indigenous land can be seen as a structure that has not yet ended. I conclude by arguing that rectification can be a precondition for genuine reconciliation.</p> Timothy Waligore Copyright (c) 2019-11-25 2019-11-25 11 2 15 28 Injustice and Collectivization in World Politics <p>In Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics Catherine Lu endorses the idea that those who contribute to the reproduction of structural injustice have responsibilities to address that injustice (Lu, 2017). However, in the book, Lu does not explore the grounds and justification for recognising such a responsibility. In order to address this deficit, this paper proposes that those likely to contribute to the reproduction of structural injustice, in the future, have precautionary duties, in the present, that require them to take action aimed at preventing their future contribution. It is proposed that these ‘collectivization duties’ (Collins, 2013) require them to act responsively with a view to forming a collective that can end the structural injustice in question. This account recommends a collective-action solution alongside recognising that each socially connected agent is obliged to act. However, it does not entail that amorphous groups bear responsibilities and is appropriate in its attribution of blame, thus avoiding both Nussbaum’s (2011) critique of perpetually forward-looking accounts and the ‘agency objection’ (Wringe, 2010).</p> Elizabeth Kahn Copyright (c) 2019-11-25 2019-11-25 11 2 29 50 10.21248/gjn.11.02.217 Shame, Justice, and Decolonization: A Reply to Catherine Lu <p>This paper discusses two possible difficulties with Catherine Lu’s powerful analysis of the moral response to our shared history of colonial evil; both of these<br>difficulties stem from the rightful place of shame in that moral response. The first difficulty focuses on efficacy: existing states may be better motivated by shame at<br>the past than by a shared duty to bring about a just future. The second focuses on equity: it is, at the very least, possible that shame over past misdeeds ought to be<br>brought into the conversation about present duties, in a manner more robust than Lu’s analysis allows.</p> Michael Blake Copyright (c) 2019-11-25 2019-11-25 11 2 51 57 10.21248/gjn.11.02.212 Essay Prize Introduction <p>N/A</p> Christine Straehle Copyright (c) 2019-11-25 2019-11-25 11 2 58 58 10.21248/gjn.11.02.200 Responsibility and Climate-induced Displacement <p>This paper addresses the phenomenon of climate-induced displacement. I argue that there is scope for an account of asylum as compensation owed to those displaced by the impacts of climate change which needs only to appeal to minimal normative commitments about the requirements of global justice. I demonstrate the possibility of such an approach through an examination of the work of David Miller. Miller is taken as an exemplar of a broadly ‘international libertarian’ approach to global justice, and his work is a useful vehicle for this project because he has an established view about both responsibility for climate change and about the state’s right to exclude would-be immigrants. In the course of the argument, I set out the relevant aspects of Miller’s views, reconstruct an account of responsibility for the harms faced by climate migrants which is consistent with Miller’s views, and demonstrate why such an account yields an obligation to provide asylum as a form of compensation to ‘climate migrants.’</p> Jamie Draper Copyright (c) 2019-11-25 2019-11-25 11 2 59 80 10.21248/gjn.11.02.182 Challenging Humanitarian Intervention? <p>N/A</p> Sara Van Goozen Copyright (c) 2019-11-25 2019-11-25 11 2 81 89 10.21248/gjn.11.02.213 Shaping the Capability Approach: Robeyns’ Modular View <p>N/A</p> Nicolas Brando Copyright (c) 2019-11-25 2019-11-25 11 2 90 95 10.21248/gjn.11.02.215 Justice in Action <p>N/A</p> Ashley Kennedy Copyright (c) 2019-11-25 2019-11-25 11 2 96 98 10.21248/gjn.11.02.214