Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn <p><em><img class="shadow" src="/public/site/images/adminglobal/Cover-GJ-20192.png" alt="" align="left">Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric</em> (TPR) is a peer-reviewed, open-access e-journal which publishes original research in international political theory, with special emphasis on global justice. We are particularly interested in bridging the gap between political theory, empirical research, and the study of political practices and communication. <a title="About the Journal" href="/global/index.php/gjn/pages/view/about-the-journal">Read more...</a></p> University Library Johann Christian Senckenberg, Frankfurt am Main, Germany en-US Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric 1835-6842 Introduction https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn/article/view/243 <p>N/A</p> Clare Heyward Laura Lo Coco Copyright (c) 2021 Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric 2021-07-28 2021-07-28 13 01 i vi 10.21248/gjn.13.01.243 Armstrong on Justice, Well-being and Natural Resources https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn/article/view/186 <p>This paper argues first that Armstrong is led to see natural resources primarily as objects of consumption. But many natural resources are better seen as objects of enjoyment, where one person’s access to a resource need not prevent others from enjoying equal access, or as objects of production, where granting control of a resource to one person may produce collateral benefits to others. Second, Armstrong’s approach to resource distribution, which requires that everyone must have equal access to welfare, conceals an ambiguity as to whether this means equal opportunity for welfare, or simply equal welfare – the underlying issue being how far individuals (or countries) should be held responsible for the use they make of the resources they are allocated. Third, when Armstrong attacks arguments that appeal to ‘improvement’ as a basis for claims to natural resources, he treats them as making comparative desert claims: if country A makes a claim to the improved resources on its territory, it must show that their comparative value accurately reflects the productive deserts of its members compared to those of countries B. But in fact, A needs only to make the much weaker claim that its members have done more than others to enhance the value of its resources. Overall, Armstrong’s welfarist approach fails to appreciate the dynamic advantages of allocating resources to those best able to use them productively.</p> David Miller Copyright (c) 2021 Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric 2021-07-28 2021-07-28 13 01 1 16 10.21248/gjn.13.01.186 Special Claims from Improvement: A Comment on Armstrong https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn/article/view/247 <p>Chris Armstrong argues that attempts at justifying special claims over natural resources generally take one of two forms: arguments from improvement and arguments from attachment. We argue that Armstrong fails to establish that the distinction between natural resources and improved resources has no normative significance. He succeeds only in showing that ‘improvers’ (whoever they may be) are not necessarily entitled to the full exchange value of the improvement. It can still be argued that the value of natural and improved resources should be distributed on different grounds, but that the value of improvements should be conceived differently.</p> Clare Heyward Dominic Lenzi Copyright (c) 2021 Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric 2021-07-28 2021-07-28 13 01 17 32 10.21248/gjn.13.01.247 Chris Armstrong on Global Equality and Special Claims to Resources https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn/article/view/184 <p>In ‘Justice and Natural Resources,’ Chris Armstrong offers a rich and sophisticated egalitarian theory of resource justice, according to which the benefits and burdens flowing from natural (and non-natural) resources are ideally distributed with a view to equalize people’s access to wellbeing, unless there are compelling reasons that justify departures from that egalitarian default. Armstrong discusses two such reasons: special claims from ‘improvement’ and ‘attachment.’ In this paper, I critically assess the account he gives of these potential constraints on global equality. I argue that his recognition of them has implications that Armstrong does not anticipate, and which challenge some important theses in his book. First, special claims from improvement will justify larger departures from the egalitarian default than Armstrong believes. Second, a consistent application of Armstrong’s life plan-foundation for special claims from attachment implies that nation-states may move closer to justify ‘permanent sovereignty’ over the resources within their territories than what his analysis suggests.</p> Kim Angell Copyright (c) 2021 Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric 2021-07-29 2021-07-29 13 01 33 49 10.21248/gjn.13.01.184 Attachment, Sustainability, and Control over Natural Resources https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn/article/view/189 <p>In this paper, we discuss Armstrong’s account of attachment-based claims to natural resources, the kind of rights that follow from attachment-based claims, and the limits we should impose on such claims. We hope to clarify how and why attachment matters in the discourse on resource rights by presenting three challenges to Armstrong’s theory. First, we question the normative basis for certain attachment claims, by trying to distinguish more clearly between different kinds of attachment and other kinds of claims. Second, we highlight the need to supplement Armstrong’s account with a theory of how to weigh different attachment claims so as to establish the normative standing that different kinds of attachment claims should have. Third, we propose that sustainability must be a necessary requirement for making attachment claims to natural resources legitimate. Based on these three challenges and the solutions we propose, we argue that attachment claims are on the one hand narrower than Armstrong suggests, while on the other hand they can justify more far-reaching rights to control than Armstrong initially considers, because of the particular weight that certain attachment claims have.</p> Laura Lo Coco Fabian Schuppert Copyright (c) 2021 Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric 2021-07-28 2021-07-28 13 01 50 66 10.21248/gjn.13.01.189 Armstrong's Resource-Egalitarianism Theory and Attachment https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn/article/view/188 <p>The paper analyses the interrelationship between Armstrong’s egalitarian theory and his treatment of the ‘attachment theory’ of resources, which is the dominant rival theory of resources that his theory is pitched against. On Armstrong’s theory, egalitarianism operates as a default position, from which special claims would need to be justified, but he also claims to be able to incorporate 'attachment' into his theory. The general question explored in the paper is the extent to which ‘attachment’ claims can be ‘married’ to an egalitarian theory. The more specific argument is that a properly constrained attachment theory is more plausible than Armstrong’s egalitarian theory. It also criticizes attachment and improvement accounts as justifying permanent sovereignty over resources. The paper argues that neither of those arguments aim to justify the international doctrine of permanent sovereignty.</p> Margaret Moore Copyright (c) 2021 Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric 2021-07-28 2021-07-28 13 01 67 79 10.21248/gjn.13.01.188 Global Welfare Egalitarianism, Resource Rights, and Decolonization https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn/article/view/190 <p>This paper argues that land and resource rights are often essential in overcoming colonial inequality and devaluation of indigenous populations and cultures. It thereby criticizes global welfare egalitarians that promote the abolition of national sovereignty over resources in the name of increased equality. The paper discusses two ways in which land and resource rights contribute to decolonization and the eradication of the associated inequality. First, it proposes that land and resource rights have acquired a status-conferring function for (formerly) colonized peoples so that possession of full personhood and relational equality is partially expressed through the possession of land and resource rights. Second, it suggests that successful internal decolonization depends on access to and control over land and resources, especially for indigenous peoples.</p> Kerstin Reibold Copyright (c) 2021 Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric 2021-07-28 2021-07-28 13 01 80 98 10.21248/gjn.13.01.190 Greening Global Egalitarianism? https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn/article/view/185 <p>In <em>Justice and Natural Resources: An Egalitarian Theory</em> (2017)<em>, </em>Chris Armstrong proposes a version of global egalitarianism that – contra the default renderings of this approach – takes individual attachment to specific resources into account. By doing this, his theory has the potential for greening global egalitarianism both in terms of procedure and scope. In terms of procedure, its broad account of attachment and its focus on individuals rather than groups connects with participatory governance and management and, ultimately, participatory democracy – an essential ingredient in the toolkit of green politics and policy-making. In terms of scope, because it does not commit itself to any particular moral framework, Armstrong’s theory leaves the door open for non-human animals to become subjects of justice, thus extending the realm of the latter beyond its traditionally anthropocentric borders. I conclude that these greenings are promising, but not trouble-free.</p> Alejandra Mancilla Copyright (c) 2021 Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric 2021-07-28 2021-07-28 13 01 99 114 10.21248/gjn.13.01.185 A Reply to My Critics https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn/article/view/245 <p>It is a real pleasure to reply to so many thoughtful and probing responses to my book. In what follows, I will focus on six key themes that emerge across the various pieces. Some of them call into question core commitments of my theory, and in those cases I will try to show what might be said in its defence. Quite a number of the critics, however, present what we might call expansionist arguments: though they endorse some of the arguments I make, that is – or pick up some of its key concepts – they seek to push them in new and interesting directions. I will suggest that many of those arguments look likely to be successful, though I will also express caution about one or two of them. I doubt, however, that I will be the final judge of their success. Early on in the book I express the hope that it might provide a set of conceptual tools capable of advancing discussions about resource justice more broadly, even for scholars who reject my own idiosyncratic approach. Having made that gambit, I cannot now claim to have a monopoly on the use of the tools in question. Witnessing the use that others have already made of them has been a refreshing and rewarding experience.</p> Chris Armstrong Copyright (c) 2021 Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric 2021-07-29 2021-07-29 13 01 115 137 10.21248/gjn.13.01.245 Essay Prize Introduction https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn/article/view/246 <p>N/A</p> Leonie Smith The Editors Copyright (c) 2021 Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric 2021-07-24 2021-07-24 13 01 vii vii 10.21248/gjn.13.01.246 Who May Geoengineer: Global Domination, Revolution, and Solar Radiation Management https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn/article/view/237 <p>This paper uses a novel account of non-ideal political action that can justify radical responses to severe climate injustice, including and especially deliberate attempts to engineer the climate system in order reflect sunlight into space and cooling the planet. In particular, it discusses the question of what those suffering from climate injustice may do in order to secure their fundamental rights and interests in the face of severe climate change impacts. Using the example of risky geoengineering strategies such as sulfate aerosol injections, I argue that peoples that are innocently subject to severely negative climate change impacts may have a special permission to engage in large-scale yet risky climate interventions to prevent them. Furthermore, this can be true even if those interventions wrongly harm innocent people.</p> Patrick Smith Copyright (c) 2021 Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric 2021-07-28 2021-07-28 13 01 138 165 10.21248/gjn.13.01.237